We analyze the long-run return performance of 27 value-weighted equity portfolios based on a classification of the US energy sector that follows traditional industrial organization categories. When adjusted to market and fuel risks, portfolio returns show that both vertical integration and horizontal diversification failed to produce shareholder value during the 1990-2003 period. This confirms the theoretical predictions of both financial economics and industrial organization and shows that the wave of corporate restructuring that has interested US energy industries over the last decade may have occurred at a net cost to firm shareholders.
Economic theory posits both positive and negative impacts of horizontal diversification of firm value. It also maintains that vertical integration produces value, when firms internalize functions which may not be adequately performed in the market. Nonetheless, there is large empirical evidence indicating that horizontal diversification across multiple activities is generally harmful to stock value, while vertical integration has at best mixed effects. For instance, Lang and Stulz (1993) , Berger and Ofek (1995) and Servaes (1996) show the presence of a discount in the value of diversified firms with respect to single business companies in various industries. Likewise, in an era of growing commoditization, the theoretical rationale of vertical integration is increasingly challenged by the possibility of outsourcing various stages of firm value chains. And both facts seem to be significant throughout time and across countries.
Is this the case also in the energy sector? To answer this question, two separate aspects should be taken into account. The first has to do with the relative scarcity of industrybased literature on the value of fuel diversification and vertical integration in the energy sector. Mainstream research seems to have little interest in the financial value of these strategies; hence some novel empirical analyses may be useful. The second aspect regards some evident idiosyncrasies of the industry. There are proven complementarities in the production of various fuels (for example, between oil and natural gas in their extraction) or in the transformation of a primary source of energy into a secondary source (as Hunt (2002) illustrates in the cogeneration of power and steam). Therefore, it could be hypothesized that the energy sector enjoys some special conditions, for which both horizontal diversification and vertical integration possibly have inherent value.
In this chapter, we measure the financial value of these conducts by focusing on the equity return of a large sample of energy listings in the United States. Using daily portfolio returns, adjusted by systematic and fuel risks, we find scarce evidence to support the value-creating character of both phenomena. While our analysis shows some limited value linked to vertical integration, there seems to be a significant diversification discount across various US energy industries. This confirms previous empirical findings in other industries and seems to refute the specificities of the energy business. The claimed synergies stemming from vertical and horizontal expansions do not easily materialize and this may attest both to the inferior ability of firms, with respect to equity markets, to allocate capital internally among various businesses and to the negative effect of agency costs on equity value when firm executives engage in vertical expansion.
The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 11.2 briefly summarizes the existing empirical literature on horizontal and vertical expansion. Section 11.3 illustrates the econometric methodology through which we determine the risk-adjusted performance of energy equities. Section 11.4 describes the dataset of equity returns under investigation. Section 11.5 presents our results which, for clarity, are separately discussed in distinct sub-sections. Finally, in Section 11.6, we draw some inferences from the econometric findings which are presented in Section 11.5. § 11.2 -Literature Background
-Vertical Integration
In his classic contribution, Coase (1937) sets the foundation of the theory of the firm. Corporations and markets are alternative choices with respect to production organization, and transaction costs are the cornerstone. Corporations vertically expand until the marginal cost of internalizing production equals the marginal cost of outsourcing it in the market. For instance, when buyers incur sunk costs to manage repeated transactions, they develop an incentive to (upward) internalize suppliers into their firm, so as to avoid potential losses linked to the latter's opportunism. Similarly, sellers are inclined to downward internalize distribution when exposed to potential losses because of high concentration among their customers.
By leveraging on this general rationale, various authors have further discussed the factual consistency of firm expansion. Bain (1956 Bain ( , 1959 points out that vertical integration, like the integration of separate activities along a value chain, reflects the creation of market power. Tirole (1988) sees it as a profitable response to the cost of contiguous monopolies (Tirole 1988) . Others think it may facilitate price discrimination (Perry, 1978) or it can be used to raise rivals' costs by increasing their costs of entry in the industry (Aghion and Bolton 1987 , Ordover, Salop and Saloner 1990 , Hart and Tirole 1990 . Finally, Stigler (1951) advances a life-cycle theory arguing that, in an infant industry, vertical integration is more likely because the demand for specialized inputs is too small to support their independent production. In general, contractual incompleteness, combined with asset specificity, complexity and uncertainty, play a central role in driving transaction costs and in the increase of the probability that opportunistic behaviour may plague market relations (Carlton, 1979) . So, as Joskow (1998a) 
points out, 'There is clearly no shortage of theories identifying potential incentives for vertical integration.'
With this abundance of hypotheses, empirical studies have obviously thrived and have attempted to assess the factual importance of various factors as principal drivers of transaction costs. Most industrial organization surveys are product-based and focus on single products or services. Among them, studies deal with automobile components: (Klein, Crawford and Alchian 1978 , Klein 2000 , Monteverde and Teece 1982 , Walker and Weber 1984 , Langois and Robertson 1989 ; with coal: (Joskow 1985 , 1987 , 1988b , Kerkvliet 1991 ; with aerospace systems: (Masten 1984) ; with aluminium (Stukey 1983 , Hennart 1988 ; with chemicals: (Lieberman 1991) ; with timber: (Globerman and Schwindt 1986) ); with carbonated beverages: (Muris, Scheffman and Spiller 1992) ;with pulp and paper: (Ohanian 1994) ; with property-liability insurance: (Regan, 1997) . In all these studies, the evidence significantly supports the role of transaction costs in driving vertical integration. 1 1 To illustrate a few among them, Monteverde and Teece (1982) and Masten (1984) link transaction costs to proxies for asset specificity, such as worker-specific knowledge and production component complexity. Klein (1988) shows that specific human capital in the form of technical knowledge is a major determinant for the decision to integrate vertically. Masten, Meehan, and Snyder (1989) enlarge At the industry level, it appears that vertical integration is valuable when asset specificity combined with market concentration (in downward or upward production stages) raise expected transaction costs and provide a strong incentive to internalizing contractual relations.
-Horizontal Diversification
Horizontal diversification consists, instead, of corporate expansion into more than one industry across businesses not necessarily related to each other. With respect to vertical integration, the theoretical grounding behind horizontal diversification is less clear-cut. In particular, two partially competing explanations are at work.
On the one hand, industrial organization suggests that, because of commonalities in technology or economies of scale, firms may profit from synergies through the allocation of internally generated cash flows across different businesses (Williamson, 1975) . By diversifying internally, firms can, in fact, expand without bearing the risk of paying the transaction costs linked to the exploitation of synergies in a contractual fashion. As a result, diversification usually occurs throughout related industries, although conglomerates at times claim that expansion across unrelated businesses may equally provide substantial synergies from non industry-specific economies of scale and scope.
On the other hand, financial economics points out that firms should not attempt to do internally what their shareholders can more efficiently accomplish in the capital market. If shareholder value maximization is the objective of the firm, diversification operated by mixing equity portfolios can provide shareholders with many of the benefits linked to horizontal diversification as a strategy (such as reducing business risk and taking advantage of new investment opportunity), at virtually no cost.
As Jensen and Meckling (1976) point out, the decision to internally expand a firm has, in fact, an explicit cost for shareholders, since it is often conditioned by a divergence of interest between firm managers and shareholders that is greater than potential profits justified by synergies. Shareholders indeed do not have the possibility of perfectly monitoring managers, so managers may choose to expand to appropriate value for themselves (in the form of perquisites). Therefore, by appointing executives and giving them the power of managing, shareholders often incur a different type of transaction cost-an agency cost-which, ultimately, may partially or completely offset the benefits of synergies and destroy shareholder value.
the discourse to more production factors and compare the relative importance of relationship-specific human and physical capital, arguing their importance as an incentive to vertically integrate. Hennart (1988) uses the number of actual and potential trading partners to compare the extent of upstream vertical integration in the aluminium and tin industries (the greater their number, the smaller the sunk investments and the smaller the uncertainty associated with the transaction). Finally, Caves and Bradburd (1988) construct an index of forward vertical integration for a sample of 83 US manufacturing industries. They confirm Bain and Tirole and find that vertical integration rises with growing concentration in supplying and buying industries. They also show that vertical integration rises with spending on R&D and with capital-to-labour ratios.
Given this theoretical contrast, empirical work has here a thornier problem to deal with and, accordingly, its findings may be more debatable. However, the current availability of an extensive dataset on stock prices and their fine statistical basis has increasingly given the lead to financial research in this field. As distinguished from industrial organization research, these studies focus on the market as a whole and not on single industries.
Three studies provide a broad overview of the general effect of horizontal diversification and do not leave much doubt about its financial consequences. Morck, Schleifer, and Vishny (1990) show that acquiring firms, engaged in takeovers, experience negative returns as an immediate value adjustment to their future expected performance, when they announce unrelated acquisitions; while Lang and Stulz (1994) and Berger and Ofek (1995) find that, in most cases, diversified firms trade at a discount relative to a portfolio of single-segment firms in the same industries.
The hypothesis here is that diversification causes conglomerate firms to ex-post generate a different stream of cash flows than they would have as single-segment firms. Numerous studies indeed confirm this and, specifically, show that horizontal expansion often results in lower firm performance because of various agency problems. For instance, these include incompetent or irrational managers, competent but self-interested managers, wasteful spending in general and wasteful investment in poorly performing divisions in particular and, finally, the inability of the internal economy of the firm to correctly signal to managers good investment opportunities.
§ § §
To summarize and conclude this review, it appears that horizontal diversification vis-à-vis vertical integration seems to be unable to produce the value that it could theoretically create, particularly when unrelated activities are considered. This, nonetheless, may still be untrue in the case of certain energy activities-as indicated in the introduction-which, because of technological and business commonality, could actually liberate synergies when integrated. Moreover, as the energy sector is also characterized by high asset specificity and high industrial concentration, it could also represent a good empirical playground for factually observing the positive effect of vertical integration. The following sections, accordingly, are dedicated to the verification of this hypothesis. § 11.3 -Methodology
Tracking the value creation of vertical integration and horizontal diversification among energy firms requires establishing whether these strategies pay off for shareholders when they are discretionally undertaken by firm executives. To do this, it is first necessary to form different equity portfolios that separate energy firm stocks in two dimensions:
1) the fuel/energy that firms produce and/or trade-namely, oil, natural gas, power, coal and their combinations; 2) the vertical stage of business in which firms are involvedcustomarily defined in the energy business as upstream, midstream or downstream activities, and their integrations.
In this manner, it is possible to separately observe the value performance of -A) portfolios of pure players-that is, firms engaged in a single productive stage of one type of energy; B)
portfolios of horizontally diversified firms-that is, companies involved in the production/trade of two or more types of energy, whether involving one or more stages of production; C) portfolios of vertically integrated firms-that is, companies involved in the integrated production of a single type of energy across two or more stages of their value chain, by measuring their risk-adjusted returns over a sufficiently long time window.
The analysis of portfolio returns is preferable to the investigation of individual firm returns, since portfolios, by pooling more equities in a single asset, yield returns less affected by firm specificities and statistical disturbances. Here, we exploit this property extensively, while maintaining the ability of portfolios to single out firm strategies, by drawing the aggregation rationale directly from the industrial organization literature. As a result, we can avoid the traditional Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) through which census authorities separate firms according to their activities-a form of classification often used in financial studies of this type-and, thus, eliminate the risk of forming portfolios according to a taxonomy which is somewhat irrelevant for the purpose of this study.
A preliminary aggregation is presented in Table 11 .1. As the scheme illustrates, pureplayer basic portfolios, which pool single-fuel and single-segment firms, are first identified.
3 Table 11 .1 -Basic Portfolios
However, these preliminary nine basic portfolios do not manage to include all firms in the sector. For instance, firms engaged in the extraction and distribution of oil-oil integrated firms-need to be tracked by a portfolio which results from the unification of OU and OD portfolios. As a consequence, starting from portfolios in Table 11 .1, we identify 13 other integrated portfolios that complete the initial taxonomy and provide a list of 22 basic and integrated portfolios presented in Table 11 .2 below. These 22 portfolios include 681 energy equities listed in the US according to the breakdown shown above and cover the entire set of activities observed in the sector.
In order to further mimic the diversification strategies that are discussed in the industrial literature, we subsequently proceed to the consolidation of a few among them and obtain five aggregated portfolios which are presented below. Figure 11 .1 gives a specific depiction of how this aggregation takes place. Its rationale in connection with the horizontal possibilities of fuel diversification in the energy sector is self-evident. Daily returns on each of the 27 portfolios identified so far are then determined by summing daily individual firm returns weighted by firm daily market capitalization.
Value-weighted portfolio returns, therefore, give an economically focused and normalized measure of performance, but also a rather gross measure. Portfolio weighted returns are, in fact, just an absolute measure of value creation. They track the change in the value of a portfolio of energy firms for an unspecified shareholder, but do not correct this change by considering the various types of risk that may be of interest for an investor who buys and holds energy stocks in the long term, nor by considering his ability to diversify his holdings through portfolio management. 1) On the one hand, as financial theory suggests, measuring the relative covariance of energy portfolio returns with market-wide weighted portfolio returns (determined across all main US equity bourses) provides a measure of the systematic risk borne by energy equities. Systematic risk is the risk of herding with market trends. Hence, it may be seen as the possibility that energy equities may simply fail to protect their holders from the risk of plummeting, when the whole market is in a bearish phase.
2) On the other hand, measuring the relative covariance of energy portfolio returns with daily fuel price returns (determined using fuel prices registered in US commodity markets) provides a measure of the fuel risks that affect energy equities. Energy firms do, in fact, produce and trade fuels, so they consistently maintain a large part of their assets in fuels and their derivates. The possibility that these firms' stocks may simply follow commodity market trends and fail to insulate their holders from the danger of losing value when fuel prices diminish is thus material.
Using portfolio absolute returns and various risk measures tracking the types of exposure just mentioned, we determine risk-adjusted returns by two complementary approaches which are elucidated in the following two sub-sections. 
-Fama-French Approach
First, we employ the well-known French (1993, 1996) approach in order to econometrically link our firm portfolio returns to three explanatory factors (which are all modelled as US market-wide portfolios). These three factors (as calculated by CRSP, see next section) are, respectively: 1) the daily weighted return of the US market-wide portfolio (Factor 1); 2) the daily time series of two special types of average portfolio returns, constructed from six benchmark portfolios, which divide US firms according to their value size and their market-to-book ratios (Factor 2 and 3).
6
The first of the latter two series (Factor 2) is the average daily return difference between the yield of small value firms and large value firms (small-minus-large-SML, a measure of size risk). The second of the latter two series (Factor 3) is the daily return difference between the returns of high growth firms and low growth firms (high-minuslow-HML, a measure of growth risk).
7
Using this method, we estimate an econometric specification of the type,
All daily returns fed to each of the four time series on both sides of equation [11.1] are determined as excess-returns. Excess-returns are defined as daily returns in excess of the daily yield on US treasury bonds, which represents an approximation of the risk-free investment rate, R ft , (the yield that an investor receives for holding a risk-less financial asset that pays compensation over time with certainty or, in other words, the time value of money). Therefore, portfolio returns R it on the left side of [11.1] are precisely excessreturns determined as, R it = R * it  R ft , where R * it are total portfolio weighted-returns determined on day t for each of the 27 portfolios presented above (thus, with i=(1, 2, …, 27)). As such, R it solely measure the compensation that an investor receives for bearing a risky asset in the form of an energy equity portfolio.
8 Likewise, M t , SMB t and HML t are the part of the daily return, on each of the portfolios chosen as a risk factor, that exceeds the risk-free rate. Betas,
i , are then regression coefficients (that is, factor sensitivities). Finally, ε t is an error term.
In equation [11.1] , the first regression coefficient-the market beta, β 1 i -represents the most relevant piece of information, since it tracks the systematic risk borne by an energy portfolio in its widest specification. Because of the partial correlation between all explanatory factors, its estimation is here adjusted by the presence of the other two return factors (SMB t and HML t ) and gives a synthetic measure of the sensitivity of an energy portfolio to market risk.
9 Therefore, measuring how much an energy portfolio yields in a given time window, and subsequently weighting such return performance by its market beta, provides the risk-adjusted measurement of return that we need. Let us suppose that we have a large dataset of past observations between today (t) and a remote earlier date (tm).
10 Given the large number of available observations, it is possible to preliminarily estimate our model over an early part of the entire dataset (that is, between tm and tn, with tn being a later date than tm), beginning from the oldest observation. This first estimation assesses the preliminary explanatory role of our three factors for energy firm returns. Once this has been done, the (in-sample) estimated model can then be used to determine what the (out-of-sample) return on an energy portfolio should have been on the first day after the estimation interval (tn+1). This is done by plugging into the three factor terms their return for that day, and by using previously estimated beta values. This fitted (that is, predicted) return can then be compared with the actual return observed on that first day after the estimation interval. The difference between that day's actual and fitted returns yields a second type of excess-return estimation (not only in excess of the risk free rate, but also in excess of what an investor's compensation should be, given the risk factor considered in the estimation), a datum that measures whether the energy portfolio has abnormally yielded more or less than expected. Repeating this procedure every subsequent day (that is, estimating a daily regression between tn+2 and t) permits building a time series of abnormal returns for each energy portfolio. The evolution of these excess-returns over time provides, in turn, some relevant information on the dynamic behaviour (by the factors considered) of the risk-adjusted performance of energy portfolios.
11 One complication in this procedure is the need to establish how many observations should enter in the estimation window of each daily regression (namely, what should be the value of mn). Predetermined rules are not available, but a consistent approach is to choose the estimation length that minimizes the average absolute value of excess returns, since this implies minimizing the out-of-sample error of the model.
-Multi-Factor Approach
As mentioned above, energy firms are naturally invested in the underlying fuels they produce or trade. This suggests that equity portfolio returns may significantly covariate with fuel prices. We observe that in a de-segmented market like the US, informed investors holding energy firm equities have the ability to diversify their portfolios by directly investing in fuels, which are tradable commodities. Therefore, we assume that energy equities should compensate investors and produce positive risk-adjusted returns, not only to the extent that they offer protection against market risks, but also if they protect unbiased investors from fuel price risks and provide a good alternative to investments. Therefore, to the extent that energy firm portfolios significantly respond to fuel price oscillations, it is possible to integrate equation [11.1] with additional return factors tracking fuel risks.
Let us convert daily fuel prices into daily fuel excess returns by using the statement,
where R jt is a daily excess return on the j-th fuel on day t, P jt is the j-th fuel price on the same day. Different time series of returns on J fuels can now be used as return factors and equation [11.1] can be integrated as follows,
In equation [11.3] gammas now represent portfolio return sensitivities to daily fuel returns. This model can then be employed in the same manner as described in the previous subsection for the classic Fama-French three factor model. Hence, riskadjusted (by market and fuel risk) performance and excess-returns on various energy portfolios can be measured.
-Estimation
Consider first that the most straightforward approach to estimate [11.1] and [11.3] is to use ordinary least squares (OLS) over the entire available time window. This would yield a single value for all regression coefficients (β i and γ i ) in the equations. But, given the long period of time involved in the estimation, these OLS parameters would likely suffer from two limitations.
(1) They would be highly sensitive to several outlying observations that plague longitudinal datasets, as a result of market crises and unanticipated events. (2) They would not be able to track changes in the sensitivity of equity portfolios to risk factors (that is, changes in β i and γ i ) and would just average them out in a conditional mean.
12
Compared to OLS 13 , several estimation methods may provide some improvements when long-term market betas need be measured. For instance, robust estimation, generalized autoregressive conditional heteroskedastic (GARCH) models and Bayesian methods may, in various ways, take care of outliers, but only partially address the problem of temporal changes in the assessment of factor regression coefficients.
14 In this study, we hold temporal modifications of return sensitivity to risk factors in great importance and, as described in Subsection 11.3.1, we take care of their impact in a direct fashion. Therefore, instead of relying on a single estimation that uses all observations in the time series to improve the determination of regression coefficients, we prefer to observe their evolution over time through rolling regressions. Note, that since this entails estimating a multiple set of regressions, each of them could make use of one of the methodologies just described and could theoretically address both the problem of bias and volatility of regression coefficients. However, since we allow the number of observations that enter the estimation window of each rolling regression to vary and optimize the number according to the daily out-of-sample predictive ability of in-sample estimations, we deem that-given the reduced length of the estimation window and the large number of regressions involved in this study-using a different approach than OLS represents a very minor improvement at the cost of some significant information on coefficient volatility. § 11.4 -Data Stock data used in this study are collected in the form of daily returns from the Center for Research in Security Price (CRPS). Our dataset comprises 14 years of daily observations (from 1990 through 2003) for 681 energy firms listed in the US equity markets. Sampled firms encompass four energy industries: oil, gas, power and coal.
The business nature of firms here considered is preliminarily assessed using CRSP industrial segments. However, recent studies have shown that CRSP industrial segments may suffer from some limitations.
15 For this reason, we control CRSP information on all firms and individually match them to one of the 22 structural portfolios presented above by analyzing their core business. Our analysis is based on: (1) business information directly released by the firm; (2) business news information as archived by Lexis-Nexis and Factiva; and (3) CRSP industrial segments, when no other source of information is available.
Apart from aggregated portfolios, the attribution of a firm to the 22 basic and integrated portfolios in Table 11 .2 is univocal; a firm that is inserted in one portfolio is not included in any other. Our portfolio taxonomy is maintained stable throughout the time window considered in the study. This implies that, over time, new firm listings and firm de-listings modify two measures, namely: (1) the number of firms tracked by each portfolio and (2) the total market value of each portfolio. Since we customarily determine portfolio returns as the weighted average of the singular daily returns on each listing, using market capitalization as a weight, 16 we do not keep track of delisting returns unless they are specifically tracked by CRSP. As a result, this may introduce some bias in our measure of portfolio performance.
17 However, given the large pool of tracked data and the relative concentration of energy industries, firm de-listings, which generally apply to small businesses, have limited overall effects on our estimations. 15 CRSP segments follow SIC codes as specified by the US Bureau of Census. 16 Formally, given a set of K firms included in the i-th portfolio, each daily portfolio return R it results from, 1 1
In the equation above, v kt and R kt are, respectively, the daily market value and the daily return of each firm included in the portfolio. 17 Not keeping track of de-listing returns is tantamount to assuming that an investor holding a portfolio is able to anticipate a de-listing on its previous day and simultaneously sell off the interested security. In fact, daily returns are determined as relative increases in the share price of a listing over its previous day's price. Hence, new listings have an impact on portfolio returns that are first verified on the second day of their listings, while de-listings (which may generate a -100 per cent daily return) do not impact portfolio returns since they do not have market capitalization on the day of their de-listing. This assumption evidently contradicts the informational asymmetry that most investors bear in real equity markets and biases the calculation of portfolio returns. CRSP provides correcting information to account for this. However, this information may be partially incomplete. See Shumway (1997) for an extensive treatment of the problem. Observing the historical return performance of all equity portfolios presented in Section 11.2 reveals different stylized facts. These appear both along the vertical (production stages) and horizontal (fuel) dimensions. We shall discuss them separately. However, before doing that, a few general aspects concerning the entire sector should be mentioned. First, it should be observed that the largest investments in energy equities concern oil firms. In Figure 11 .2, portfolios are plotted as pies in a Cartesian space where market betas, β 1 i , are measured along the x-axis, while the y-axis measures mean yearly observed portfolio returns. In this and the following figures, unless otherwise specified, β (Table 11 .3 at the end of this chapter summarizes OLS estimation values and statistics). Pies are then scaled according to the total market capitalization of each portfolio on 31 December 2003. Different patterns are attributed to different fuels: vertical marks to portfolios including oil or predominately oil firms (Portfolios from 1 through 8 in Table 11 .2), dots to portfolios of purely or predominately natural gas firms (Portfolios from 9 through 15) and diagonal lines to portfolios of purely or predominately power firms (Portfolios from 16 through 22).
The two largest portfolios are those which include vertically and horizontally integrated oil and natural gas firms (Portfolio 3) and integrated upstream oil and natural gas firms (Portfolio 2). Specifically, Portfolio 3 includes all of the largest global oil and gas companies (such as Exxon-Mobil, for instance). From the graph it is evident how oil pies outsize and sometimes completely cover all the others. Utility portfolios are hardly comparable to oil portfolios, while natural gas portfolios are striking for their overall irrelevance by value in the US economy.
Note that the Cartesian space is crossed by an upward sloped thick line called Security Market Line (SML). This line connects two points: the observed risk-free yearly rate over the 1990-03 period (equal to 4.38 per cent), as determined by CRSP, using yields on US government debt and associated to the beta = 0 position on the x-axis, with the mean yearly return yielded by the overall US equity market portfolio (equal to 11.46 per cent), as determined by CRSP, including all dividends paid by all US listed firms over the same time period, and associated to the beta = 1 position 18 . According to financial theory, the SML can be seen as the plot of all possible combinations of market risk (betas on the x-axis) and associated compensation for holding an asset (returns on the yaxis) that an unbiased equity investor can obtain by diversifying his portfolio across all available securities in the US market (by mixing risky assets with governmental securities).
19 Therefore, the space north-west of the SML represents an area of positive excess-risk-adjusted-returns, since it contains return-risk combinations that yield more to investors than what they would normally obtain through portfolio diversification (that is, by diversifying their equity portfolios across available securities in the market). By the same token, the space south-east of the SML represents an area of negative excessrisk-adjusted-returns.
Here two general aspects are of interest. On the one hand, the large majority of energy portfolios have market beta, β 1 i , less than one. Therefore, they shield investors from systematic risk better than holding the entire market portfolio would do. On the other hand, owning equity in an energy business is substantially better than just investing in the market portfolio, in government bonds, or in any combination of the two. In fact, most portfolios fall above the SML. Only drilling oil in isolation (Portfolio 1) and integrating the various production stages in the natural gas industry (Portfolios 10 and 12) yield less than what portfolio diversification would return to investors. It is difficult to determine which of the industries, oil or power, is the better of the two, although it seems that pure power generation creates tremendous value for stockholders (Portfolio 16).
-Value Performance along the Vertical Dimension

-Oil Industry
Vertical integration in the oil industry produces good absolute value performance. Figure 11 .3 shows the evolution of $100 originally invested in oil upstream, downstream and integrated upstream and downstream activities, as well as in oil as a commodity. The integrated firm portfolio clearly outperforms all other portfolios as well as the underlying commodity. Market Beta
Mean Yearly Return
Simple portfolio diversification path
Vertical integration gain
This performance, however, changes when adjusted returns instead of portfolio values are considered. In Figure 11 .4, it is evident how, on a market risk basis, upstream activities yield much less than downstream businesses (the first plot above the SML, while the second fall below). Replicating vertical integration through portfolio diversification implies to replicate Portfolio 2 (OU+OD) by simply mixing assets included in Portfolio 1 (OU) and 7 (OD). If one mixes equities with comparable value, this is tantamount to obtaining a mimicking portfolio that would position between the plotting of each single-segment portfolio (since portfolio returns and market betas are linear quantities with respect to the return and risk of the equities they include). Here, we observe that vertically integrated activities (Portfolio 2) do better than simply averaging the performance of single segment portfolios, as they position above and to the right of the virtual equally-weighted mimicking portfolio. However, vertical integration does not manage to create risk adjusted returns more than downstream businesses do in isolation (Portfolio 2 indeed plots at a distance above the SML which is slightly less than the one of Portfolio 7). If one then focuses on fuel price risk ( Figure  11 .3), it is also evident that, although two out of three oil portfolios (with the exception of upstream activities) dominate portfolio diversification, their values appear to significantly correlate with oil prices, a fact which may suggest some flaws in their price-hedging properties and which is further discussed later in this Section. 20 11.5.1.2 -Natural Gas Industry
Vertical integration in natural gas businesses, compared to the oil industry, does not produce comparable absolute value performance. Figure 11 .5 shows the increase of $100 of original investment in the upstream only, downstream only, midstream only, integrated natural gas portfolios, as well as in natural gas as a simple commodity. Integrated natural gas concerns create less or, at most, equal value, as compared to pure players. Portfolio 10 is then particularly inefficient and manages to create less value than investing in natural gas prices in isolation.
This negative result is significantly confirmed in terms of risk adjusted returns. In Figure 11 .6, integrated gas companies are either on or below the SML, while singlestage businesses are always well above the market-wide portfolio diversification boundary. As far as fuel price risks are concerned (Figure 11 .5), the correlation of natural gas portfolio values with natural gas prices is then less evident than in the case of oil businesses. This may suggest some better ability of natural gas firms to insulate stockholders from price exposures. 
-Power Industry
Vertical integration in the power industry, similarly, has little power. Figure 11 .7 shows that $100 of original investment in upstream activities not only produces much more value than the same amount of money invested in downstream businesses, but also more than investments in integrated activities. For shareholders, synergies from controlling the entire value chain in the industry seem, therefore, to be almost irrelevant and they would be better off concentrating their holdings in specialized generation firms (Portfolio 16). This is however true only throughout the 1997-01 period, since, after the beginning of 2001, the value performance of upstream businesses has significantly diminished. Market Beta
Mean Yearly Return
Unlike the other two industries examined so far, the performance of vertical integration among power firms slightly improves when risk-adjusted returns are considered. All power portfolios fall above the SML in Figure 11 .8 and vertical integration seems to acceptably compare to pure portfolio diversification. Integrated companies yield, in fact, more than pure downstream firms. They dominate the SML and are closer to their theoretical mean positioning between the highest performers (Portfolio 16) and the lowest performers (Portfolio 21) than in any other case concerning integrated businesses examined so far. In substance, downstream businesses expose stockholders to very little risk, but yield irrelevant excess-returns, whereas upstream firms are still the most rewarding (their distance north-west of the SML is the largest among all energy portfolios), but require stockholders to bear very significant systematic risk (their beta positioning is most to the right). This finding seems to match the regulatory structure of the US power industry where downstream activities have been traditionally regulated, while upstream activities have been partially opened to competition since 1998 and may justify the apparent effect of vertical integration on risk-adjusted returns. In Figure 11 .7 we also present the value performance of the integrated coal portfolio. In the US power industry, coal represents half of the total generation capacity (according to the EIA).
Since we do not have daily power prices and daily coal prices, the coal portfolio may provide a proxy for a preliminary fuel price risk analysis. From a graphic analysis, it is evident how power firm portfolios (particularly generators) significantly correlate with the coal portfolio, from 2000 onwards. As in the case of oil firm portfolios, this may imply a partial inability of power firms to insulate their shareholders from underlying price dynamics. This issue is also further addressed later in this section.
-Value Performance along the Horizontal Dimension
11.5.2.1 -Oil with Natural Gas Figure 11 .9 shows the cumulated return for $100 of original investment in pure player portfolios vs. the absolute performance of an equal investment in diversified firm portfolios. The absolute value creation of most diversified businesses is lower than that of fuel concentrated activities. Only in one case (Portfolio 8) do diversified ongoing concerns outperform pure players and this occurs when firms specialize in downstream activities.
The same facts are confirmed when risk is considered. In Figure 11 .10, pure and diversified firm portfolios are plotted in the market beta space (statistics for the OLS estimation of equation [11.1] on aggregated portfolios are provided in Table 11 .4). It is evident how horizontal diversification between oil and gas does not significantly create value, even in terms of risk-adjusted returns. First, all diversified portfolios fall to the right of pure players portfolios. It appears that firms load risk when they diversify between fuels. Second, while all portfolios dominate the SML, in no case do diversified firms do better than pure natural gas players. Only Portfolio 3, the one which includes large oil and natural gas majors, manages to outperform pure oil players. This may be evidence of a stabilization effect that large oil companies seem to enjoy in risk-adjusted terms and could suggest that business diversification pays off only to the extent that firms have sufficient size and business expertise to fully profit from it. 
-Natural Gas with Power
What is observed for diversification between oil and natural gas is even more confirmed when power utilities diversify into natural gas. Figure 11 .11 and 11.12 show these facts. The first graph shows how, in all cases, diversified businesses produce less absolute cumulated value than pure players. Diversification in upstream activities (Portfolio 12) outperforms other portfolios for a while, but fails to maintains a constant result in the long run (notice however that this portfolio, like Portfolio 11, includes only one firm, Williams Cos.; thus it has low statistical significance).
The poor performance of horizontal diversification in risk-adjusted terms is even more compelling. Diversifying across energies is bad news for shareholders. The vertical distance between pure player portfolios and the SML dominates all other cases, with power production being the best type of investment. Only Portfolio 11 apparently reduces systematic risk in a significant way 21 .
In Figure 11 .13, all the evidence on horizontal diversification is summarized in a single graph. To avoid low significance, only aggregated portfolios (from 23 through 27) are considered here. Results do not significantly change. The arrows highlight the returnrisk effect of diversification. While the summation of oil and natural gas increases the performance of the former, it does not really create value through synergies in terms of better positioning above the SML (diversified oil and natural gas firms yield slightly more than natural gas firms, but for significantly more risk); diversification between power and natural gas appears to be value destroying. Diversified utilities plot both below pure power players and natural gas firms. Their horizontal integration does not significantly protect investors from market risk; on the contrary it pushes equities towards the SML. 
-Value Performance Considering Market and Fuel Risks
As explained in Section 11.3, a more thorough assessment of the risk-adjusted performance of energy portfolios requires considering fuel in addition to market risks. In order to better track changes in the strategies of firms, we should then consider the information that running rolling regressions may provide. Therefore, we present in this subsection the results obtained by rolling daily regressions between 1992 and 2003 using OLS as the estimation procedure for equation [11.2] . For simplicity and better statistical significance, all results presented in this subsection are relative to aggregated portfolios only. Since fuel risk is then particularly significant with respect to equity investors' ability to diversify into different fuels, we focus here on the horizontal dimension, where fuel diversification is accomplished within firms. with various estimation window lengths (from ten to 1,000 observations) as a criterion of choice. Mean excessreturns are first negative and then positive and equate to zero when the estimation window length is between 470 and 480 observations (slightly less than two years of trading data). Therefore, we present here results obtained with an estimation window of 478 observations, a length that implies the possibility of using rolling regressions to draw inferences only between 1992 and 2003. Table 11 .6 summarizes the estimation statistics for 3025 daily regressions run over this time interval.
22 Note that this model specification is robust with respect to serial correlation, which is not significantly detected on estimation errors. Residuals are also relatively well behaved in terms of their normality. Their skewness and kurtosis are contained between zero and one and five and six, respectively, in all cases, except for the case of Pure Power Players (for which, it has been already signaled that equation [11.2] is not the best specification). However, the Jarque-Bera statistics reject normality in all estimations. This is most likely the result of outlying observations which confer heteroskedasticity to the dataset. White heteroskedasticity tests indeed find that OLS estimation errors are driven by some or all of the squared regressors in [11.2] , for all portfolios. In the presence of heteroskedasticity, the biggest drawback of OLS estimation is the significance and value of regression coefficients. Given the purpose of this study, we test if regression coefficients are significant and, in the case of market betas, have significantly different values, running a GARCH(1,1) specification on different sub-windows of the entire dataset. In all cases, except for the case of Pure Power Players, regression coefficients are significant. GARCH estimated market beta values converge to the OLS values at the second decimal. Therefore, we do not reject the significance of OLS results. Figure 11 .14 shows the effect of diversifying between fuels. The similarity with Figure  11 .13 is patent and no new fact is put in evidence. Considering fuel prices as regressors does not significantly change the value of market betas. The only appreciable difference is that, using equation [11.2] , the integration between natural gas and power results is to be performed with a relatively more significant increase in market risk than with a simple Fama-French estimation (Portfolio 27 falls further to the right). It appears to be confirmed, therefore, that, even with respect to fuel risks, energy firms fail to bestow value on shareholders by diversifying. : 1992-95, 1996-99 and 2000-03 . Two separate aspects clearly emerge.
1) All firms have increasingly become vulnerable to systematic risk during the passage from the first to the second set of four years. Both solid black and grey arrows in the figure show that portfolios have progressively shifted to the right, while maintaining similar vertical height. Only pure oil firms (PO) appear to have improved performance as they were increasing risk and, thus, represent the only equity portfolio which has increased its risk-adjusted performance (its vertical distance from the SML) during the first eight years.
2) Equity portfolios made up of pure power players (PP) and diversified natural gas and power utilities (GP)-grey arrows-have consistently diminished their return performance throughout the entire 12 years, while all other types of firm-black arrows-after a first negative period, seem to have positively corrected their performance.
Here the story seems to be one of fuel prices. Power related portfolios appear to be conditioned by the effect of liberalization. Since, in deflated terms, mean power prices have diminished in the US (see EIA statistics reported in Table 11 .7), the opening of the industry to competition has increasingly exposed them to market trends and their risk, while integration into natural gas has failed to produce the synergies that were expected, particularly in terms of risk diversification (the GP portfolio is the one showing the largest shift to the right during the second of the two time periods). On the other hand, after a first negative period, oil and natural gas firms have probably benefited from a moderate increase in industrial commodity prices (the oil price boom of the last two years is excluded from this study) and the full effect of their restructuring that took place during the second part of the nineties.
Finally, by using rolling regressions, it is also possible to determine out-of-sample excess-returns as explained in Section 11.3. These returns can be modelled as the yield that an investor would enjoy if he were to be compensated daily for buying and holding equities, given the exposures that equation [11.2] tracks in the form of market and fuel risk factors. Such a yield represents, therefore, a positive or a negative additional compensation that investors receive. As usual, we gauge the value evolution of $100 invested in each aggregated portfolio at this excess yield. Figure 11 .16 shows results and a daily break-down (throughout the 1992-03 period), of the market and fuel riskadjusted performance of aggregated energy equity portfolios shown in Figure 11 .15. With the partial exception of diversified natural gas and power activities and (less so) pure oil businesses, investing in energy seems to be a good choice on a daily basis. At least four cycles seem to be identifiable : 1992-94, 1996-98, 1999-01 and 2002-03 . During these periods, portfolio values have bulged, following first increasing then contracting underlying general stock and energy trends. With respect to the analysis in Figure 11 .15, integration between oil and natural gas seems to yield some better synergic results, particularly in the 1996-98 triennium. On the other hand, integration between natural gas and power appears even more to be driven by the tremendous performance of pure power firms and always yields less than simple portfolio diversification by shareholders would yield. Finally, it even fails to rebound when pure power equities peak again during the 2002-03 period and ends up below the positive cumulated excess-return region. § 11.6 -Conclusions
In this study we investigate the ability of vertical integration and horizontal diversification to create value for US energy firm shareholders. Our results are mixed and appear to partially confirm the postulations of industrial organization, as far as the first type of corporate strategy is concerned, and of financial economics, with respect to fuel diversification.
On the one hand, vertical integration within energy portfolios seems to produce little risk-adjusted return performance for all types of energy firms. For industrial organization theory, this may, perhaps, indicate that asset specificity and the possibility of opportunistic behaviour across various stages of production are not a sufficient cause to release material synergies as a result of upstream or downstream integration. Across the various types of energy, this is all the more true for the natural gas industry, a type of activity which, as a result of vertical integration, has experienced the worst results in the time window considered. Only power utilities seem to partially escape this reality, possibly because of their ability to create value by being integrated upstream into generation-a relatively small industry (see Figure 11 .2) that, in isolation, has experienced the best equity performance among all energy portfolios. US antitrust authorities, both in their praxis and their periodical reports, treat energy industries as relatively non-concentrated. Accordingly, they have largely permitted the significant wave of corporate restructuring through mergers and acquisitions that reshaped the US energy sector during the last decade. Given the linkage between concentration and opportunistic behaviour (see Subsection 11.2.1), industrial structure may, therefore, be at the origin of the contained performance of vertical integration in the sector. A fortiori, this may also suggest that firm management might promote vertical integration beyond its strict transactional cost rationale, admittedly showing that corporate expansion decisions could be grounded in motivations unrelated to firm value maximization.
This last remark becomes still more evident when results of horizontal diversification are considered. Whether including or excluding fuel risk as a return factor, in no case does diversifying across energies, through corporate expansion, outperform simple shareholders' portfolio diversification. Figure 11 .13 and 11.14 show, with little uncertainty, that firm horizontal strategies fail to produce value for shareholders, while Figure 11 .15 illustrates that, even if some partial mitigation of this fact were to be observed during the 2000-04 period, it would most likely be due to a general amelioration of the overall performance of oil and natural gas industries that interested both diversified and pure players (pure power players and diversified portfolios including power, on the other hand, continued and even deepened their decline in the period considered), rather than to better synergies. Such evidence, perhaps disappointing with respect to the theoretical value of economies of scope, plainly confirms contemporary corporate financial theory, while not refuting the explanatory power of transaction cost economics. The residual loss in equity value associated with corporate expansion (a transaction cost) probably out-weighs the possible synergic value of unrelated mergers and acquisitions. Clearly, we do not empirically test here if this is effectively explained by failures in the agency relationship between firm managers and their shareholders, although this seems to be suggested by our results. 
